Perceptions of China’s Role in Myanmar’s Political Crisis

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“Myanmar’s Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar Relations – A Survey (2024),” was published in August, 2025, as a translation of the original Burmese version published in June, 2025. This survey is a part of research conducted by the ISP-Myanmar’s China Studies. ISP-Myanmar has been conducting this annual survey since 2022, making the 2024 survey the third iteration.

Questions–16 and 17

How are the relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China?

For survey questions 16 and 17, respondents were asked about their perceived relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China following the 2021 coup, using a four-point scale to rank them (from 1: “Not good at all” to 4: “Very good”). Although the “neutral” option was included in the 2022 survey, it was not included in the 2023 or current surveys. The inquiry on Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) was newly added to this year’s survey.

Questions–18 and 19

How are the relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China?

For survey questions 18 and 19, respondents were asked about their perceived relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China following the 2021 coup, using a four-point scale to rank them (from 1: “Not good at all” to 4: “Very good”). Although the “neutral” option was included in the 2022 survey, it was not included in the 2023 or current surveys. The inquiry on Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) was newly added to this year’s survey.

Questions–20 and 21

How are the relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China?

For survey questions 20 and 21, respondents were asked about their perceived relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China following the 2021 coup, using a four-point scale to rank them (from 1: “Not good at all” to 4: “Very good”). Although the “neutral” option was included in the 2022 survey, it was not included in the 2023 or current surveys.

Question–22

How are the relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China?

For survey question 22, respondents were asked about their perceived relations between Myanmar’s key actors and China following the 2021 coup, using a four-point scale to rank them (from 1: “Not good at all” to 4: “Very good”). Although the “neutral” option was included in the 2022 survey, it was not included in the 2023 or current surveys.

Among respondents, 80 percent perceived relations between China and the State Administration Council (SAC) as good. Similarly, 79 percent viewed China as having good relations with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). On the other hand, 69 percent saw relations between China and the National League for Democracy (NLD) as not good. Over half—52 percent—also believed relations between China and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) were not good while 61 percent of respondents viewed China’s relations with the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) in northern Shan State as good. Meanwhile, 58 percent assessed relations with the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) positively, while 34 percent saw them as not good. Just over three quarters of respondents (76 percent) characterised China’s relationship with the National Unity Government (NUG) as not good. Overall, key stakeholders viewed China as maintaining good relations with the SAC, USDP, FPNCC, and 3BHA, while having less favorable—or not good—relations with the NLD, SNLD, and NUG, to varying degrees.

Since the previous annual survey, there has been a moderate shift in key stakeholders’ views regarding relations between China and Myanmar’s various key actors. Responses citing relations between China and the SAC as good increased by 11 percentage points from 2023 and by 33 points from 2022. More respondents also perceived relations between China and the USDP as good with a 13-point increase from 2023. However, fewer respondents viewed relations between China and the NLD as good, with a 13-point decrease from 2023 responding “good” and a 20-point increase from 2023 and 14-point increase from 2022 responding “not good”. Respondents who viewed relations between China and the SNLD as “not good” increased by 16 percentage points from 2023. Moreover, fewer respondents viewed relations between China and the FPNCC as good with a 14-point decrease from 2023. Similarly, more respondents perceived relations between China and the NUG as not good with a 17-point increase from 2023 and an 11-point increase from 2022.

Analysis of the Survey Results

In comparing responses from the six surveyed community groups, EAOs and political society reported the highest perception of “good” relations between China and the SAC, with 93 percent and 88 percent, respectively. All community groups viewed relations between China and the USDP as “good,” particularly PDFs/LDFs at 88 percent and EAOs at 86 percent being the highest. All groups perceived relations between China and the NLD as “not good,” with CSOs at 78 percent and PDFs/LDFs at 75 percent reporting the highest levels. Similarly, relations between China and the SNLD were viewed as “not good” by 61 percent of CSOs and 55 percent of business communities, the highest reported of all the groups. All groups considered relations between China and northern Shan State EAOs (FPNCC) as “good,” with EAOs at 67 percent and prominent figures at 64 percent being the highest. Likewise, all groups viewed relations between China and the 3BHA as “good,” with PDFs/LDFs at 69 percent and the business community at 62 percent reporting the highest rates. All groups perceived relations between China and the NUG as “not good,” with EAOs at 87 percent and the prominent individuals category at 86 percent being the highest.

For analysis, responses of “Not good at all” and “Not good” were grouped under “Not good,” while Good” and “Very good” were grouped under “Good.”

Question–23

What political system does China want to see in Myanmar?

Respondents were asked to select which option best matched their opinion among the two options for the political system that China wants to see in Myanmar where ethnic issues and armed conflicts are rampant.

Seventy-two percent of respondents said they believed that China considers an “authoritarian political system” to be suitable for Myanmar, while only 15 percent thought that China favours a democratic model for Myanmar. A further 12 percent declined to answer. This perception has strengthened over time. The proportion viewing China as favouring authoritarianism for Myanmar rose by 12 percentage points from 2023 and 17 points from 2022. Meanwhile, the share believing that China prefers a democratic system for Myanmar fell by 11 points compared with last year’s survey.

Analysis of the Survey Results

In comparing responses from the six surveyed community groups, all groups believed that “China wants to see Myanmar as an authoritarian state.” Specifically, 82 percent of CSOs, 81 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 73 percent of EAOs, 67 percent of prominent individuals, 60 percent of the business community, and 44 percent of political society expressed this view.

Question–24

How do you think China will engage in efforts to resolve Myanmar’s post-coup political crisis?

A list of countries and organizations that China could cooperate with in its involvement in Myanmar were presented to our respondents, and asked to select the most likely partner for cooperation.

Asked how China is likely to engage in Myanmar’s ongoing political crisis, 34 percent of respondents, the highest proportion, said that Myanmar should cooperate with ASEAN’s Special Envoy. Another 26 percent expected China to act unilaterally, while 20 percent anticipated cooperation with neighbouring countries. Just 13 percent believed China would develop a new international framework involving both regional and global actors.

Analysis of the Survey Results

The perception that China will collaborate with the ASEAN Special Envoy was most prevalent in four out of six groups. Specifically, 43 percent of CSOs, 38 percent of the political society group, 36 percent of the business community, and 33 percent of EAOs expressed this view. Meanwhile, 38 percent of PDFs/LDFs and 33 percent of EAOs believed China will act unilaterally. Additionally, 33 percent of prominent figures expected China to cooperate with neighboring countries.

Question–25

Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar’s domestic affairs?

Respondents were presented with the question, “Do you think China practices a non-interference policy in Myanmar’s domestic affairs?” and asked to respond either in the affirmative or negative.

A large majority—85 percent—of respondents said China does not adhere to a policy of non-interference in Myanmar’s political crisis. Just 13 percent believed Beijing maintains such a policy. The perception of China’s interference has grown steadily. Compared to the 2022 survey, the share of respondents rejecting China’s non-interference claim rose by 18 percentage points, and by 12 points compared to 2023. Meanwhile, the view that China does follow a non-interference policy declined by 11 points from the previous year.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Across all six surveyed community groups, most respondents rejected the notion that China is adhering to a policy of non-interference in Myanmar’s political crisis. Specifically, 92 percent of prominent figures, 89 percent of CSOs, 87 percent of EAOs, 74 percent of the business community, and 69 percent of both the political society group and PDFs/LDFs expressed this view.

Question–26

Do you think the post-coup political crisis brought China and Myanmar closer together?

Respondents were asked if they thought that the political crisis following the 2021 coup brought China and Myanmar closer together or not.

A clear majority of respondents—72 percent—believed that Myanmar and China have not been drawn closer by Myanmar post-coup political crisis. Just 26 percent said the two countries grew closer. This sentiment has hardened over time. Compared to the 2022 survey, the share of respondents who dismissed the notion of deepened ties rose by 12 percentage points, and by 18 points compared to 2023. Meanwhile, the proportion who believed the relationship had strengthened fell by 16 points from last year’s survey.

Analysis of the Survey Results

The majority of most groups, except the political society group, stated that Myanmar and China have not grown closer due to the political crises and conflicts since the 2021 coup. Specifically, 88 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 79 percent of the business community, 73 percent of both EAOs and prominent figures, and 70 percent of CSOs expressed this view. Notably, the views among the political community were divided; half believe the two countries were brought closer while 44 percent believe otherwise.

Question–27

In your opinion, what has shaped China’s policies toward Myanmar in the post-coup period?

The question asked what factor they believe China primarily considers when formulating policies toward Myanmar following the 2021 coup: (1) China takes Myanmar public opinion into serious consideration, or (2) China mainly considers engagement with whoever is in power. Respondents were asked to select one of two factors that best match their opinion.

The vast majority of respondents (91 percent) thought that China prioritizes engaging with whoever holds power in shaping its policies toward Myanmar. Only five percent held the view that China takes Myanmar public opinions into serious consideration. Some shifts in perception have emerged since the last survey. The proportion of respondents who view China as favoring those in power increased by 12 percentage points from 2022 and by nine points from 2023. Conversely, the share of people who believed China takes public opinions in Myanmar into consideration fell by six points from 2022 and seven from 2023.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Across all six community groups surveyed, respondents overwhelmingly agreed that China prioritises engagement with those in power in shaping its Myanmar policy. This view was unanimous among EAOs (100 percent) and was similarly high among CSOs (96 percent), PDFs and LDFs (94 percent), and prominent individuals (92 percent). Although relatively lower, the majority of the business community (76 percent) and political society (75 percent) also agree with this view. Among those who believe that China takes Myanmar public opinions into serious consideration in its policy toward the country, the business community shows the highest level of agreement, at 13 percent.

Question–28

How effective is China’s push to resolve Myanmar’s political crisis within the 2008 constitutional framework?

Respondents were asked to evaluate the level of effectiveness of China’s support for resolving Myanmar’s political crisis within the 2008 constitutional framework. Given options ranged from 1. Not effective at all to 4. Very effective. This question was newly introduced in this round of survey.

China has urged that Myanmar’s political crisis be resolved within the framework of the 2008 Constitution. A majority of respondents (81 percent) viewed this approach unfavourably: 42 percent said it was not effective at all, while 39 percent said it was not effective. Only 17 percent considered the approach effective.

Analysis of the Survey Results

All stakeholder groups viewed China’s push to resolve Myanmar’s political crisis within the framework of the 2008 Constitution as not effective, to varying degrees. Specifically, 87 percent of CSO respondents, 83 percent of prominent individuals, 82 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 80 percent of EAOs, 66 percent of the business community group, and 56 percent of the political community group expressed this view. Among those who viewed China’s push as effective, the political society group showed the highest percentage with 31 percent, followed by the business community with 26 percent.

Unless otherwise stated, responses of ‘Not effective at all’ and ‘Not effective’ are grouped together as ‘Not effective,’ while ‘Effective’ and ‘Very effective’ are grouped as ‘Effective’ for the purpose of analysis.

Questions–29 and 30

How practical are China’s three bottom lines in contributing to the resolution of Myanmar’s political crisis?

For survey questions No. 29 and 30, respondents were asked to assess the practicality of the “Three Bottom Lines” proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi for resolving Myanmar’s political crisis, as stated during his visit to Myanmar. These bottom lines are: (1) Myanmar should not be subject to civil strife, (2) Myanmar should not be detached from the ASEAN family, and (3) Myanmar should not be infiltrated by and interfered with by external forces. This question is newly added this year.

Question–31

How practical are China’s three bottom lines in contributing to the resolution of Myanmar’s political crisis?

For survey question No. 31, respondents were asked to assess the practicality of one of the “Three Bottom Lines” proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi for resolving Myanmar’s political crisis, as stated during his visit to Myanmar. These bottom lines are: (1) Myanmar should not be subject to civil strife, (2) Myanmar should not be detached from the ASEAN family, and (3) Myanmar should not be infiltrated by and interfered with by external forces. This question is newly added this year.

Of the three “bottom lines” proposed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his visit to Myanmar, two—namely that Myanmar should not experience civil strife and should not be infiltrated by external forces—were widely regarded as unrealistic. Three-fourths of respondents viewed these two bottom lines as impractical. In contrast, 61 percent considered the third—Myanmar remaining within the ASEAN fold—as a practical goal.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Across the six surveyed community groups, all groups regarded the goal of preventing civil strife as impractical. Specifically, this view was shared by 85 percent of CSOs, 81 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 71 percent of prominent figures, 60 percent of EAOs, 57 percent of the business community group, and 50 percent of the political society group. A similar pattern was observed regarding the impracticality of preventing arbitrary interference by external forces, with 82 percent of CSOs, 81 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 80 percent of EAOs, 68 percent of the prominent individuals group, and 64 percent of the business community group expressing this view. However, half of the political society group (50 percent) considered this bottom line to be practical. In contrast, the majority of groups viewed maintaining Myanmar’s engagement with ASEAN as a practical objective. This included 93 percent of EAOs, 67 percent of the business community group, 63 percent of the political society group, 59 percent of the prominent individuals group, 56 percent of CSOs, and 50 percent of PDFs/LDFs.

Questions–32 to 34

How helpful has China’s election process advocacy been?

For survey questions No. 32 to 34, respondents were asked to choose one answer from the given options. The questions asked how helpful China’s advocated election process has been in solving Myanmar’s conflict resolution long term; for ASEAN’s effort to address Myanmar’s crisis; for the interests of the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and in resolving the immediate political crisis in Myanmar. The responses ranged from 1. Not helpful at all to 4. Very helpful.

Question–35

How helpful has China’s election process advocacy been?

The questions asked how helpful China’s advocated election process has been in resolving the immediate political crisis in Myanmar. The responses ranged from 1. Not helpful at all to 4. Very helpful. Respondents were asked to choose one answer from the given options.

China has encouraged the SAC to pursue a political exit via elections. However, 81 percent of respondents answered that this approach is not helpful for long-term conflict resolution. Regarding how helpful the election process has been for ASEAN’s efforts to address Myanmar’s crisis, 64 percent of respondents answered “not helpful.” Similarly, 77 percent perceived that the election process would not help resolve the current political crisis. In contrast, 86 percent considered it helpful for the Myanmar military regime.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Comparing responses across the six surveyed community groups, 100 percent of PDFs/LDFs expressed that China’s electoral process push was not helpful for long-term conflict resolution (represented by the responses “not at all helpful” and “not helpful”). Similarly, 89 percent of CSOs, 87 percent of EAOs, 82 percent of prominent individuals, and 64 percent of the business community shared this view. Notably, 50 percent of the political society group considered it helpful for long term conflict resolution in Myanmar (represented by the responses “helpful” and “very helpful”). Regarding the question on whether the election pathway could be helpful for ASEAN’s efforts, 88 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 73 percent of EAOs, 68 percent of CSOs, 65 percent of prominent individuals, and 50 percent of the business community group responded that it was not. In contrast, 56 percent of the political society group held the view that the election process helped ASEAN’s position, followed by 40 percent of the business community. All groups similarly perceived that the election process was not helpful for resolving the current political crisis, with 94 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 83 percent of CSOs, 80 percent of EAOs, 76 percent of the prominent individuals group, 67 percent of the business community group, and 63 percent of the political society group expressing this view. Conversely, all groups viewed the election process as beneficial to the regime. This perspective was shared by 94 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 88 percent of prominent individuals, 85 percent of CSOs, 84 percent of the business community, 81 percent of political society, and 80 percent of EAOs.

Unless otherwise stated, responses of ‘Not helpful at all’ and ‘Not helpful’ are grouped together as ‘Not helpful,’ while ‘Helpful’ and ‘Very helpful’ are grouped as ‘Helpful’ for the purpose of analysis.

Question–36

What are China’s motivations for increasing its engagement in resolving Myanmar’s political crisis?

Respondents were asked to identify the main reasons for China’s more active involvement in resolving Myanmar’s political crisis relative to prior years, selecting up to three reasons from a provided list.

Recent events indicated China has been engaging more actively in resolving Myanmar’s political crisis. Among the various reasons that could have prompted China to take more action, the top three reasons chosen by respondents were: China’s strategic projects being attacked or seized by 63 percent of respondents, military successes of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) by 58 percent and increasing unity of the resistance forces by 37 percent. Other reasons include the EAOs’ declining interest in regional talks, like the Haigeng Discussions, chosen by 33 percent; security threats to Chinese nationals in Myanmar, cited by 31 percent; SAC’s rigid stances, mentioned by 27 percent; and the National Unity Government’s (NUG) moderate view of China, selected by nine percent.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Across the six surveyed community groups, 82 percent of prominent figures, 80 percent of EAOs, 63 percent of the political society group, and 57 percent of the business community group most strongly believe that China’s increased involvement stems from its strategic projects being attacked or seized. The military successes of the Three Brotherhood Alliance were cited as a reason by 67 percent of CSOs and 63 percent of PDFs/LDFs. Additionally, 63 percent of PDFs/LDFs attributed China’s involvement to the growing unity among the opposition forces.