Perceptions of the Role of China in Myanmar’s Peace Processes

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“Myanmar’s Key Stakeholders and their Perceptions of Sino-Myanmar Relations – A Survey (2024),” was published in August, 2025, as a translation of the original Burmese version published in June, 2025. This survey is a part of research conducted by the ISP-Myanmar’s China Studies. ISP-Myanmar has been conducting this annual survey since 2022, making the 2024 survey the third iteration.

Question–37

Perception on China’s efforts towards Myanmar’s peace processes

Stakeholders were asked to choose one option that best matches their view on China’s efforts regarding Myanmar’s peace processes following the 2021 coup.

In asking about China’s priorities in its peace efforts in Myanmar following the 2021 coup, the majority, 61 percent of respondents, indicated that China focuses on stabilizing regions where its interests are located. Only seven percent suggested that China prioritizes peace across all of Myanmar, and a mere one percent perceived that China seeks the emergence of a federal democratic Myanmar. Meanwhile, 10 percent believed that China emphasizes strengthening armed groups tied to its interests. Additionally, 14 percent rejected all the options provided. Compared to the 2023 survey, the view that China prioritizes stabilizing areas where its interests are located declined by five percentage points, while the belief in strengthening associated armed groups fell by four percentage points. Disagreement with all options rose by five points, and other perspectives increased by seven points.

Analysis of the Survey Results

The survey reveals that the majority of the respondents across all six groups predominantly believed that China’s efforts center on stabilizing areas tied to its interests. This perspective was held by the highest percentage of respondents from EAOs (93 percent). Notably, no respondents from EAOs believed that China prioritizes armed groups aligned with its interests, peace for the whole of Myanmar, or the emergence of a federal democratic Myanmar. Similarly, none of the PDFs/LDFs respondents viewed the latter two as China’s priorities. Among all the listed options, the emergence of a federal democratic Myanmar received the lowest level of agreement across all groups.

Question–38

What impact does China’s involvement have on Myanmar’s peace and political reconciliation process?

For survey question No. 38, respondents were asked to assess the impact of China’s involvement in Myanmar’s peace and political reconciliation process using a four-point scale, ranging from 1. Very negative impact to 4. Very positive impact.

Regarding the impact of China’s involvement in Myanmar’s peace and political reconciliation process, nearly two-thirds (61 percent) of respondents viewed it negatively, while over one-third (35 percent) of the respondents viewed it positively. Compared to previous surveys, negative perception has grown by 32 percentage points from 2022 and 15 percentage points from 2023.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Views on China’s involvement in Myanmar’s peace and political reconciliation process diverge sharply across groups. A majority of respondents from PDFs/LDFs (69 percent), prominent individuals (69 percent), CSOs (68 percent), and EAOs (60 percent) viewed China’s role as having a negative impact. In contrast, the political society group (69 percent) and business community (54 percent) saw it as a positive influence. Notably, 43 percent of the business community and 19 percent of the political society group still expressed negative views, underscoring internal divisions within these groups.

Unless otherwise stated, responses of “Very negative impact” and “Negative impact” were grouped under “Negative impact,” while “Positive impact” and “Very positive impact” were grouped under “Positive impact,” for the purpose of analysis.

Question–39

How much influence does China have over EAOs in northern Shan State?

Respondents were asked to assess the degree of China’s influence over EAOs in northern Shan State using a four-point scale, ranging from 1. No influence at all to 4. Significant influence.

The vast majority of respondents, totaling 96 percent, reported that China exerts influence over EAOs in northern Shan State. Notably, the majority, 62 percent, chose “some influence” and 34 percent chose “significant influence,” while only three percent believed there was no influence. Remarkably, no respondents selected “no influence at all.” Compared to the 2023 survey, the perception of China’s influence increased by four percentage points.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Myanmar’s key stakeholders across the six policy communities predominantly believed that China has influence over EAOs in northern Shan State. Nearly all prominent individuals (99 percent) reported this view, followed closely by 95 percent of CSOs, 95 percent of the business community, 94 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 94 percent of EAOs, and 87 percent of the political society group.

Unless otherwise stated, responses of “No influence at all” and “No influence” were grouped under “No influence,” while “Some influence” and “Significant influence” were grouped under “Influence,” for the purpose of analysis.

Question–40

How much influence does China have over the State Administration Council (SAC)?

For survey question No. 40, respondents were asked to assess China’s influence over the State Administration Council (SAC) using a four-point scale, ranging from 1. No influence to 4. Significant influence.

Among respondents, 92 percent reported that China wields some influence over the SAC, with 23 percent specifying “significant influence.” Only five percent perceived no influence. Compared to the 2023 survey, the perception of China’s wielding “no influence” decreased by eight percentage points.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Respondents across all communities predominantly agreed that China holds influence over the SAC. This view was held by 94 percent of CSOs, prominent individuals, and PDFs/LDFs, 93 percent of EAOs, 89 percent of the business community, and 82 percent of the political society group (represented by the responses “some influence” or “significant influence”). Notably, among PDFs/LDFs, 50 percent selected “significant influence.”

Unless otherwise stated, responses of “No influence at all” and “No influence” were grouped under “No influence,” while “Some influence” and “Significant influence” were grouped under “Influence,” for the purpose of analysis.

Question–41

The main purpose of China’s mediation between Myanmar conflict actors

A list of options were given on the primary purpose of China’s mediation efforts between EAOs along the Myanmar-China border and the SAC, such as in the Mongla (2022) and Haigeng (2023-2024) peace talks, and respondents were asked to select one option that best matched their view. This question is newly added in this round of survey.

Among respondents, the majority (69 percent) of respondents indicated that China’s mediation aims to facilitate the implementation of its strategic investment projects. Meanwhile, 12 percent perceived that China seeks to “ensure border security,” and another 12 percent viewed China’s intentions as to “reopen border trade.” Five percent believed China targets the resolution of conflicts in northern Shan State, while two percent suggested it focuses on safeguarding Chinese nationals in northern Shan State.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Respondents across all six policy communities predominantly perceived that China’s mediation efforts are driven by the goal of implementing its strategic investment projects. This view was most strongly held by 80 percent of EAOs, 73 percent of CSOs, 69 percent of PDFs/LDFs, 68 percent of prominent individuals, 63 percent of the political society group, and 57 percent of the business community group.

Questions–42 to 44

Impacts of China’s mediated talks

For survey questions No. 42 to 44, respondents were asked their views on the impacts of China’s mediated peace talks between the State Administration Council (SAC) and northern Shan State EAOs (EAOs) on some areas, using a four-point scale ranging from 1. Totally disagree to 4. Totally agree.

Question–45

Impacts of China’s mediated talks

For survey question No. 45, respondents were asked their views on the impacts of China’s mediated peace talks between the State Administration Council (SAC) and northern Shan State EAOs (EAOs) on the short-term ceasefires, using a four-point scale ranging from 1. Totally disagree to 4. Totally agree.

Among respondents, 52 percent agreed that the discussions undermined post-coup emerging political forces, while 45 percent disagreed. A clear majority (72 percent) rejected the notion that the discussions support Myanmar’s peace process, with only 26 percent in agreement. On the statement that the discussions exacerbate conflict, 63 percent agreed and 33 percent disagreed. Notably, 80 percent believed the discussions aimed only for short-term ceasefires, with just 16 percent disagreeing. Compared to the 2023 survey, perceptions that the discussions weaken post-coup political forces rose by 12 percentage points, views that they worsen conflict increased by 16 points, and the belief that they target only short-term ceasefires rose by eight points.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Myanmar’s key stakeholders expressed mixed views on the impact of China’s mediation efforts. On the statement that the discussions weaken post-coup emerging political forces, opinions were divided across all groups, with a slight majority leaning toward agreement. Regarding the impact on Myanmar’s peace process, most groups—except the political community—rejected the idea that China’s mediation supports peace efforts. Within the political community, opinions were split: 50 percent agreed, while 44 percent disagreed. The business community was similarly divided, with 47 percent in agreement and 50 percent in disagreement. On the statement that China’s mediation talks are worsening the various conflicts, a majority of the respondents from CSOs (78 percent), the prominent individuals group (61 percent) and EAOs (60 percent) agreed. On the other hand, 56 percent of the political society group, 48 percent of the business community, and 44 percent of PDFs/LDFs and 40 percent of EAOs disagreed. The view that China’s mediation discussions aimed mainly at short-term ceasefires was widely shared, with agreement ranging from a high of 91 percent among prominent individuals to a low of 63 percent among the political community.

Unless otherwise stated, responses of “Totally disagree” and “Disagree” were grouped under “Disagree,” while “Agree” and “Totally Agree” were grouped under “Agree,” for the purpose of analysis.

Question–46

How effective is China in helping the Rohingya repatriation process?

For survey question No. 46, respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of the Myanmar-Bangladesh-China tripartite solution for Rohingya repatriation using a four-point scale, ranging from 1. Not effective at all to 4. Very effective.

The majority of respondents (82 percent) viewed the Myanmar-Bangladesh-China tripartite solution for Rohingya repatriation as ineffective, with 18 percent indicating that it has not been effective at all. Only seven percent considered it effective, and no respondents rated it as very effective. Compared to the 2023 survey, no significant changes were observed.

Analysis of the Survey Results

Myanmar’s key stakeholders across all communities perceived the tripartite solution as ineffective. This view was most prevalent among the prominent individuals group (90 percent), followed by EAOs (80 percent), CSOs (80 percent), PDFs/LDFs (76 percent), the political society group (69 percent), and the business community (59 percent). Notably, 19 percent of PDFs/LDFs indicated they were unaware of the process.

Unless otherwise stated, responses of ‘Not effective at all’ and ‘Not effective’ are grouped together as ‘Not effective,’ while ‘Somewhat effective’ and ‘Very effective’ are grouped as ‘Effective’ for the purposes of interpretation and analysis.