This photo taken on 9 April 2025 shows a truck driving past a flag of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) ethnic armed group raised on a welcome arch in Lashio in Myanmar’s northern Shan State. Photo by AFP.
(This Op-ed article was originally published on The ISEAS website on September 1, 2025)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The Myanmar military’s administrative and territorial losses in Northern Shan State in late 2023, following the surprise Operation 1027 offensive launched by an alliance of ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), left a power vacuum which the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) then competed to fill.
- Other structural drivers behind the KIA-TNLA disputes include competition over resources in overlapping control areas and the expansion of influence to strengthen their bargaining position ahead of inevitable negotiations under China’s assertive mediation.
- Transactional barriers include competition over territorial self-governance and the politicising of past grievances despite both claiming civilian-centric self-government.
- Conflict-mitigation measures that can be undertaken include reaching agreement on resource-sharing standards and on a joint self-governance protocol with integrated civilian participation.
- Sustainable peace relies on both EAOs reorienting from unilateral control of the overlapping territory to an integrated and collaborative self-governance model.
INTRODUCTION
On 27 October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), a military coalition of three ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), i.e. the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Arakan Army (AA), launched an attack on forces of the State Administration Council (SAC). This so-called Operation 1027 led to further military offensives against SAC forces by EAOs in Kayah (Karenni), Kachin, and Rakhine States and Sagaing Region.
Within one year, the SAC had lost control of 24 towns across 17 townships in northern Shan State.[1] However, SAC regained control of Lashio town in April 2025, and of Nawnghkio in July.
In the remaining areas, EAOs are trying to establish administration within their respective controlled territories. The Kachin Independent Army (KIA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) have concurrently established administrative mechanisms in five of the 24 townships.
Verbal altercations between low-ranking troops on both sides have escalated into physical confrontations,[2] and even the TNLA’s commander took to voicing grievances online, and justifying the TNLA’s actions by citing past incidents in which the KIO had treated the TNLA with disrespect. Despite the announcement in March 2025 that negotiations between the two groups were underway, people living in overlapping areas nevertheless fear escalation of the disputes.[3]
This paper examines three structural factors in the KIA-TNLA conflict: SAC’s withdrawal after Operation 1027, competition over natural resources and strategic posturing for future ceasefire. It also highlights two implications of the conflict: competitive administration and politicised grievances.
This study has four substantive sections, dealing with: (1) the relation between the KIA and TNLA before the 1027 operation, (2) structural factors behind escalating tension, (3) implications of the conflicts, and (4) opportunity for peaceful coexistence.
RELATIONS BETWEEN KIA AND TNLA BEFORE OPERATION 1027
The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) has been involved in armed resistance in northern Myanmar since its founding on 25 October 1960 by seven students from Kachin University. Its armed wing, the KIA, was formed on 5February 1961 and relocated its base from Lashio to Northern Kachin State.
In 1994, the KIA entered into a ceasefire agreement with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, later renamed the State Peace and Development Council or SPDC), and developed parallel administrative and governance mechanisms within its control area. However, clashes resumed between the KIA and the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) in June 2011 after the KIO refused to transform into the Border Guard Force, which was to operate under Tatmadaw command.
The Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF/TNLA) was initially a political organisation when it was established on 12 January 1992 by members of the defunct Palaung State Liberation Army (PSLA) who chose to remain in the Karen National Union’s (KNU) control area after PSLA had surrendered to the Tatmadaw. PSLF’s armed wing, TNLA, was founded in 2009, and its founding members were given military training and other fungible support from KIA.
In December 2011, after completing military training, a group of 42 Ta’ang Youth, armed with 22 assault rifles, penetrated and established guerrilla zones in the Shweli River valley region in Northern Shan State.[4]
Ties between KIA and TNLA strengthened after KIA and the 3BHA formed the Northern Alliance; these were groups that had not signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the first multilateral ceasefire agreement sought by the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government in 2015. Back then, all three members of the Brotherhood Alliance – TNLA, MNDAA, and AA – had expressed their willingness to sign the NCA. The national military, the Tatmadaw, however, excluded them from the NCA process, citing that these groups had emerged only after the political reform began and that they had been responsible for attacks on democratically elected governments. The military demanded that these three groups disarm before they could be allowed to join the nationwide peace process. In response, KIA and the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) rejected the condition and instead founded the Northern Alliance; this grouping then launched coordinated attacks against Tatmadaw forces in Northern Shan State. In December 2016, the Myanmar government (with the National League for Democracy as the ruling party) declared TNLA, MNDAA, and AA as terrorist organisations.[5]
In contrast, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS/SSA-S), an NCA signatory based in southern Shan State, benefited from the NCA. The RCSS could continue its presence in areas under its control, and gained access to other urban areas. This created distrust towards the RCSS by other EAOs, such as the TNLA, which had not joined the NCA. When the RCSS tried to expand its presence in northern Shan State further, armed confrontations broke out between RCSS on one side and TNLA and Shan State Progressive Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA-N) on the other, particularly in Namtu, Hsipaw, and Hsenwi Townships.[6]
The RCSS and the TNLA had been engaged in renewed fighting when the 2021 coup occurred. In early 2022, RCSS completely withdrew from northern Shan State, relinquishing its bases, including Muse township which it had maintained for nearly three decades predating the NCA. Disputes continued between KIA and TNLA over taxation, recruitment, and territories,[7] while the Tatmadaw continued to maintain control over the area.
Figure 1. Illustrative Map of Current Territorial/Administrative Control in Northern Shan State
STRUCTURAL FACTORS BEHIND ESCALATING TENSIONS
Power Vacuum Following Operation 1027
With Operation 1027 and the defeat of junta forces, including the loss of a Regional Command Centre in Lashio, KIA-TNLA disputes intensified with both seeking to fill the power vacuum, especially in the overlapping areas in the five townships of Namtu, Namkhan, Kutkai, Muse, and Manton (Figure 1). However, there are limits to how much further the dispute could escalate.
Since the 2021 coup, KIA had provided military support to and cooperated with the National Unity Government (NUG), and even led the fight against the junta in Kachin and Northern Sagaing. This earned them recognition from the Bamar majority, who had had little connection with ethnic armed struggle before the 2021 coup, as a key ally in the post-2021 “Spring Revolution” (the broad resistance against military rule, and against the Myanmar military after the coup).
On the other hand, while 3BHA, including TNLA, were often perceived by the Bamar majority as China-backed armed groups seeking control of territory for material interests before the coup, they successfully linked their military objectives with popular aspirations to topple the SAC during Operation 1027. They achieved swift military success by coordinating attacks with newly-emerged groups such as the PDF Mandalay and the Danu People Liberation Army And also gained widespread media coverage by portraying themselves as partners in the Spring Revolution.
As such, both KIA and TNLA had gained popular support in parts of Myanmar beyond their respective ethnic bases. However, if tensions between the two for territorial control were to escalate into direct armed clashes, their actions would suggest a pursuit of narrower territorial interests rather than participating in the broader resistance.
Resource Competition in Overlapping Territories
Northern Shan State has abundant mineral resources such as tin, zinc, silver, copper, gold, rare earth, and coal, and the five overlapping townships host numerous mining operations. Bawdwin in Namtu township is the largest and only mining site in Myanmar which can produce refined lead and silver; the place hosts over 200 small and large skill extraction sites. Moreover, the extraction of lead, zinc, and tin is a major activity in the Bawhokyant mine in Manton township. Additionally, nearly a hundred small-scale gold-mining sites are operating along the Nammaw stream.
Competition over mining assets between KIA and TNLA occurs in three ways: disputes over raw mineral extraction rights,[8] disruption of the opposing group’s supply routes,[9] and expulsion of rival bases from mining zones.[10] Resource competition has become a structural driver for conflict between the two groups.
Strategic Positioning for Future Negotiations
The expected negotiations with SAC also prompt KIA and TNLA to each consolidate their territorial control in Northern Shan.
Both Operation 1027, led by 3BHA, and the military operation in Kachin and Northern Sagaing, led by KIA, achieved notable victories for them. However, these advances were constrained by coercive diplomatic intervention from China pressuring TNLA, MNDAA and KIA to engage in ceasefire talks with the SAC on a bilateral basis. Subsequently, MNDAA relinquished Lashio town, the base of the Northeast Regional Military Command, in April 2025.
TNLA had to engage in bilateral talks with SAC, facilitated by Chinese officials, in Kunming in Yunnan Province, in February 2025.[11] Although that meeting did not yield any substantive results, another round is anticipated for August.[12] In the same way, in December 2024, Chinese officials convened a meeting with KIA leadership in Kunming and urged them to pursue a bilateral ceasefire with the SAC.[13] This may have prompted TNLA to consolidate administrative control over overlapping territories in order to position itself as the sole negotiator representing these five townships. KIA, in turn, is under considerable pressure from China to stabilise the border.
IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS
Competing Administrative Frameworks
Despite publicly proclaiming civilian-centric governance structures as their goal, both KIA and TNLA enforce unilateral control in their areas of control, and reject the legitimacy of each other’s administrative authority. The TNLA joint secretary also remarked during a press conference in May that, “While there aren’t many tensions and difficulties when waging a revolution, tensions do arise when taking responsibility for administering these towns.”[14]
KIA had had continuous presence in five overlapping townships, and formalised it by establishing Brigade No.5 in 2016. On the other hand, TNLA also started troop deployment in the region in 2018. Both groups had established administrative departments prior to Operation 1027, though these departments’ actions were mostly limited to revenue collection. In May 2024, the KIA began consolidating its authority in those five townships by forming administrative bodies and establishing social service infrastructure such as schools and clinics.[15] For example, KIO established the Southern Division Administration to administer the northern Shan region. Similarly, in March 2025, TNLA initiated town hall meetings with residents and started its administrative operations.[16] In June 2025, it also established the Ta’ang Land Council (TLC) as the highest authority in TNLA-controlled territories; PSLF/TNLA chairman Tar Aik Bong serves concurrently as TLC Chair. The TLC aims to transform TNLA’s military success into administrative and political power.[17]
Politicisation of Historical Grievances
The leader of TNLA justifies its current effort to dismantle KIA administrative structures as restitution for past KIA marginalisation of TNLA. While an institutional hierarchy persists between the KIA-trained TNLA leadership and their former coaches, latent tensions in a superior-subordinate dynamic exist, albeit never publicly on show.
However, since 2022, TNLA has notably distanced itself from KIA, while building a relationship with UWSA.
Opportunities for Peaceful Coexistence
To prevent full-scale hostility between KIA and TNLA, establishing integrated civilian administrations across the overlapping territories is vital. This will however take time.
Firstly, the two groups need to settle the bilateral agreements on the resource extraction protocol. The two groups will need to avoid politicising past grievances. Secondly, the local population must be integrated, not just subjugated, into the process of territorial self-administration. Finally, an integrated governance framework incorporating both armed groups and civilians must codify clear standards for the territory’s future status. This will legitimise their position in future negotiations with the junta, and signal to neighbouring countries that they possess not merely military rigour but governance capacity.
CONCLUSION
After Operation 1027 left a power vacuum in northern Shan state, tensions between KIA and TNLA intensified, primarily due to their competition for territorial and administrative dominance. Competition over natural resources and securing a strategic position for ceasefire negotiations in the future are other objectives heightening tensions.
To mitigate the erosion of relations and foster long-term stability in the region, both groups need to reach a consensus concerning the distribution of revenue from natural resources. Following this, integrated, inclusive, and civilian-centred governance should be prioritised.
On the other hand, China is expected to continue implementing coercive diplomacy toward EAOs to halt the fighting along the China-Myanmar border, while the military council continues to escalate its counter-offensives in Northern Shan State. Therefore, it is critically important for both KIA and TNLA to reach a consensus on how to jointly manage the overlapping townships within their remaining controlled areas.
The KIA vs TNLA case is not the only one at risk of escalating into full-scale hostility. There were no fewer than eight armed confrontations between MNDAA and SSPP in Hsipaw during April. Moreover, a territorial dispute exists between the Karenni resistance forces and the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) in Southern Shan State. Resistance forces in Chin State are also at risk of conflict, due to disputes over territory.
Thus, the leadership of the various EAOs and armed resistance groups must realise that these conflicts over governance and administrative issues would impose astronomical costs on them if the disputes escalate. Addressing these issues is crucial for the overall unity and momentum of the resistance movement, as well as the credibility of each of these groups.
ENDNOTES
For endnotes[…], please refer to the original pdf document.
Htet Shein Lynn is a program associate at the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar).