Photo – Pa-O National Army Facebook
This is a human-supervised, AI-assisted translation of the original Burmese ISP Column article by Htet Shein Lynn, published on September 9, 2025.
Since the launch of “Operation 1027,” the military junta has faced significant losses in a short period. Cities were lost, and regional military headquarters fell. Subsequently, with support from some major powers, especially China, the junta exerted multifaceted military and diplomatic pressures to retake and defend its position. This effort involved collaboration with border guard forces and militias to counter resistance forces.
However, the junta does not engage in joint military operations with every militia or border guard force. This is particularly evident in southern Shan State. Despite the presence of several militias and armed groups not actively opposing the junta, it has partnered exclusively with the Pa-O National Organization/Pa-O National Army (PNO/PNA), providing weapons and technological support. The junta regime reportedly shared Russian drone technology and military training with the PNO. The junta’s decision to provide such support stems from the calculation that the PNO, armed with these resources, will not turn against it. Why did the junta particularly select the PNO to ally in its military joint operations? Whether the junta trusted it would not retaliate, among many other militias? This article aims to explain three key reasons behind this decision to select an ally for the Myanmar military.
The first reason lies in the deep patron-client relationship between the junta and the PNO/PNA, rooted in military and economic ties. Since the ceasefire with the Myanmar military, the PNO has controlled Hopong, Pinlaung, and Hsihseng as self-administered regions. Nay Win Tun, who led the PNA Battalion No. 4 and served as the PNO’s economic head, became the deputy commander-in-chief of the PNA in 2024 following the coup. Since the 1991 ceasefire, Nay Win Tun established the Ruby Dragon Company, securing permits for jade mining. By 2004, this company operated 152 jade mining sites across Kachin State (Hpakant Township), Mandalay Region (Mogok Township), Sagaing Region (Hkamti Township), and Shan State (Monghsu Township). In 2002, it donated a jade boulder weighing over 3,000 tons to the state authority. Beyond mining, the Ruby Dragon Company was established for gem trading, and the PNO operates 11 companies nationwide, spanning hotels, tourism, wine, and food industries. These deep economic ties with the military regime make it challenging for the PNO/PNA to oppose the regime militarily, as it will break apart its nationwide economic empire. This relationship is a key reason the junta chose the PNO/PNA as a battlefield ally.
The junta, beleaguered in conflict, selects battlefield allies based on three criteria: a deep patron-client relationship, complete local control, and adherence to its political agenda.
The PNO/PNA is not the only group that has a patron-client relationship with the junta. In southern Shan State, the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) also shares such ties. However, the junta does not provide it with weapons or technological support for joint operations. This can be attributed to the second reason: the PNO/PNA’s deep-rooted influence and control down to the village level in the Pa-O region, established even before the coup. The PNO won elections in the Pa-O region in 2010, 2015, and 2020, demonstrating its ability to consolidate power locally. Before the coup, although villagers were allowed to elect village administrators, the PNO/PNA directly appointed village tract administrators who supervise village administrators, ensuring tight control. This shows that no significant change can occur even at the village level without the PNO’s approval. During this period, civil society groups, such as the Kanbawza Youth Reading Club, introduced liberal values through community activities and short-term training, challenging the PNO’s dominance to some extent. However, these activities waned in the post-coup, and the PNO/PNA began directly appointing village administrators, solidifying its unrivaled authority. In contrast, the Kayan New Land Party, operating in areas like western Demoso and Moebye, cannot exert similar control due to the influence of groups like the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and Karenni Interim Executive Council (KIEC), forcing it to negotiate to station forces. The PNO/PNA’s comprehensive local authority makes it a reliable ally for the Junta.
Despite having both a patron-client relationship and strong local control, the junta does not fully trust the Wa United Wa State Party/Army (UWSP/UWSA) as a battlefield ally. This stems from the third reason: the Myanmar military avoids partnering with groups that exceed its political agenda. In the 2000s, Wa forces entered the 171 Military Region and remained there. During “Operation 1027,” they seized Hopan and Panlon from the MNDAA, and their demands for a Wa State have consistently surpassed the limits of the junta’s political agenda. During the attack on the junta’s Northeast Command, thousands of Wa troops entered Lashio claiming to “maintain peace,” the junta, despite its historical losses, rejected their offer. In contrast, the PNO/PNA has adhered to the junta’s political agenda since the ceasefire, receiving weapons and technological support as a trusted ally. Despite its electoral success and regional influence, the PNO/PNA has never gone beyond the junta’s agenda and demanded a separate state, unlike the UWSP/UWSA or Kayan New Land Party. Leveraging its authority, the PNO/PNA, with the junta’s support, has mobilized thousands of new recruits and gained even foreign assistance for drone and military training.
In summary, the junta, beleaguered in conflict, selects battlefield allies based on three criteria: a deep patron-client relationship, complete local control, and adherence to its political agenda. This analysis is preliminary, and further study of the junta’s relations with groups like Saw Chit Thu’s militia and the Shan Ni militia is needed. Such studies could benefit resistance forces by enhancing understanding of the junta’s behavior and clarifying whether disputes with non-opposing groups in their areas are allied or adversarial conflicts.
Htet Shein Lynn is a program associate at the Institute for Strategy and Policy – Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar).
The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of ISP-Myanmar.